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STAYING ABOVE THE SURFACE - SURFACE
BARGAINING CLAIMS UNDER THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Marc Mandelman*and Kevin Manara**

I. INTRODUCTION

Under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA" or "the Act"), employers must bargain collectively with the
unions that represent their employees or risk unfair labor practice
("ULP") charges.1 Under section 8(d), employers are further obligated to
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment and to the negotiation of agreements between
the parties, and read together, sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) require parties in
a collective bargaining relationship to negotiate in good faith with regard
to terms and conditions of employment. 2
The concept of bargaining in good faith is a broad notion in labor
relations, and governs facets of collective bargaining as simple as
reducing an agreement to writing and as complex as bargaining to
impasse. This article will explore how the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB" or "the Board") and judicial determinations of good
faith govern the concept of "surface bargaining," i.e., seemingly
engaging in arms length negotiations while concealing a purposeful
strategy to make bargaining futile and to avoid reaching an agreement. 3
Using Board determinations and judicial decisions as its framework, this
article will identify the different types of conduct that have been deemed
either violative of, or consistent with, good faith standards, and will
attempt to offer guidance on conduct that falls into uncertain middle

Senior Counsel, Proskauer Rose LLP.
Associate, Proskauer Rose LLP.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5),(d).
3. See NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134-35 (lst Cir. 1953).
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ground in an attempt to keep bargaining parties above the surface.
II. THE EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH
Section 8(d) of the NLRA defines the duty to bargain collectively
as an obligation to:
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and
the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession.
The express language of the statute prohibits certain types of
conduct - refusing to meet at reasonable times and refusing to put
agreed-upon terms into writing - and requires parties to confer with
respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment "mandatory subjects of collective bargaining." 5 If an employer fails to
comply with these express statutory requirements, the Board may view
the conduct as a per se violation of the Act.6
While it may appear that such a violation also, by nature, lacks
good faith, the Board treats these failures as express violations of section
8(a)(5), the duty to bargain collectively, and not necessarily as a failure
to bargain in good faith under section 8(d).7 For example, an employer
who refuses to bargain at all over wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, is quite clearly not demonstrating the
requisite good faith under section 8(d). Such conduct, however, is
viewed as an outright violation of the Act rather than as evidence of bad
faith. 8 Thus, collective bargaining under the NLRA has two essential
elements: 1) conferring with respect to the mandatory subjects of
bargaining and 2) ensuring that such deliberations are carried out in
good faith. 9 The NLRA, as originally enacted in 1935, did not include

4.
5.

29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000).
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp, 356 U.S. 342, 347-48 (1958) (discussing §

158(d)).
6. Id. at 347.
7.
8.

25 AM. JuR. 2D Proofof Facts § 1, at 340-41 (1981).
Id. at 342; see infra Section 111.

9.

Id. § 2, at 343.
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the good faith requirement. 10 Rather, the good faith concept was
developed by the Board as a means to balance the perceived inequitable
bargaining status between unions and employers in the first half of the
twentieth century.l1
"Good Faith"Defined and the "Totality of the Circumstances"
Standard
There is no single established definition of good faith in the context
of labor relations. Determining whether a party's conduct at the
bargaining table "evinces an unlawful failure to abide by the [NLRA's]
mandate to bargain in good faith" can be "an inescapably elusive
inquiry. ' ' 12 Determining good faith requires the Board and the courts to
draw inferences concerning a party's state of mind from many facts, no
one of which may have great significance standing alone.13 Collective
bargaining, then, is not simply an attitude of "take it or leave it"; rather,
"it presupposes a desire to reach ultimate agreement, to enter into a
collective bargaining contract.', 14 "Discussion conducted under the
standard of good faith may narrow the issues, making the real demands
of the parties clearer to each other, and perhaps to themselves,
and may
5
encourage an attitude of settlement through give and take."1
As part of its determination of good faith, the Board employs a
"totality of the circumstances" test when examining the various indicia
of bad faith bargaining, reviewing an employer's conduct as a whole
both at and away from the bargaining table. 16 For example, in NLRB v.
Pacific Grinding Wheel Co.,17 the Board, in reversing the Administrative
10.
11.

Id.
Id.; see Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401

(1958).
The bargaining status of a union can be destroyed by going through the motions of
negotiating almost as easily as by bluntly withholding recognition ....
As long as there
are unions weak enough to be talked to death, there will be employers who are tempted

to engage in the forms of collective bargaining without the substance.
Id. at 1413.
12.
13.
14.

NLRB v. Big Three Indus., Inc., 497 F.2d 43, 46 (5th Cir. 1974).
NLRB v. Milgo Indus., Inc., 567 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1977).
NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477,485 (1960).

15.

Id. at 488.

16.

Regency Serv. Carts, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. No. 44, at 1 (Aug. 27, 2005) (citing Pub. Serv.

Co. of Okla., 334 N.L.R.B. 487, 487 (2001), enforced, 318 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2003); Overnite
Transp. Co., 296 N.L.R.B. 669, 671 (1989), enforced, 938 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1991)).
17. 572 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Law Judge ("AL"), drew adverse inferences from the employer's
conduct, including making regressive wage offers and withdrawing a
union security provision it had previously proposed. 18 The Board
accordingly found that the employer had failed to bargain in good faith
from the date it made the first regressive proposal. 19 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit considered the Board's findings, but required additional
evidence before it would accept the Board's inference that the employer
failed to bargain in good faith.20 However, the court drew additional
negative inferences from the employer's conduct, including its violation
of a settlement agreement covering an earlier ULP charge, its continuing
pattern of communicating directly with employees, and its initial refusal
to release wage data to the union - concluding that, "[v]iewed
separately, each of these actions indicates only hard bargaining by the
company. However, viewing these actions cumulatively, as we must, we
find that there is substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion
that.., the company [bargained in bad faith]. '1
Examples of seemingly harmless acts that have contributed to a
finding of bad faith bargaining when viewed in concert with other
questionable conduct include delays in bargaining sessions blamed on
negotiators' pre-planned vacations, 22- insistence on the presence of a
stenotypist, 3 refusing to allow a union to post notices regarding union
matters on the company bulletin board,24 and refusing to provide a water
cooler.25 Conversely, isolated instances of misconduct are generally not
viewed as a failure to bargain in good faith.26
Thus, "[t]he significance of the totality [of the circumstances] rule
is that the combined effect of a number of seemingly innocuous acts,
both at the bargaining table and away from it, can lead to a finding of
bad faith., 2 7 However, the Board has been "reluctant to find bad-faith
18. Id. at 1346-47.
19. Id. at 1347.
20. Id. at 1349.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850, 852-53 (1951).
Id. at 854. In a precursor to the Pacific Grinding Wheel decision, the Reed & Prince Board

described its application of the "totality of the circumstances" rule as "[a]lthough no one of the
separate elements in this case is in itself conclusive evidence of bad-faith bargaining, when the
entire bargaining pattern of the [employer] is viewed in its totality and the individual items are
appraised together, the picture is clear ...the [employer] did not participate in the bargaining
negotiations with the good faith required of it by law." Id. at 857.
24.

NLRB v. Milgo Indus., Inc., 567 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1977).

25. Id.
26.
27.

See, e.g., UAW Local No. 1712 v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 573, 578-79 (7th Cir. 1984).
25 AM. JuR. 2D Proof ofFacts § 17, at 369 (1981).
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bargaining exclusively on the basis of a party's misconduct away from
the bargaining table., 28 Instead, the Board has generally considered
"away from the table" misconduct only in conjunction with conduct at
the bargaining table, and will look to whether a nexus exists between the
two in deciding surface bargaining cases. 29 For example, in St. George
Warehouse. Inc.,30 the Board found the employer's conduct at the
bargaining table did not evince an intent to frustrate agreement where
the employer attended frequent meetings with the union, made
concessions and reached agreement with the union on a number of
issues, proposed wage increases and gave reasons for rejecting certain
union proposals. 3' Thus, despite finding that the employer committed
away from the table violations - unilaterally transferring bargaining unit
work and refusing to provide information to the union - the Board
concluded that those violations alone did not warrant a finding of surface
bargaining absent more persuasive evidence of misconduct at the
bargaining table.32 The Board's rationalization in declining to find
liability for surface bargaining where it found away from the table
misconduct, was a lack of evidence that the unilateral changes affected
negotiations or proved that the employer had a mindset to bargain in bad
faith.33
However, an employer's away from the table misconduct can
sometimes have the opposite effect, tipping the scales in favor of a
finding of employer liability. In NLRB v. Overnite Transportation Co.,34
the employer argued that it was merely engaged in "hard bargaining"
when it maintained its bargaining stance over the course of six
negotiating sessions with the union. 35 The Seventh Circuit noted that
"[i]f the company's behavior at the bargaining table were the only
evidence of its state of mind, then it might have been difficult for the
Board to support a finding that Ovemite had no real desire to reach an

28. St. George Warehouse, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 904, 911 (2004) (citing Litton Sys., 300
N.L.R.B. 324, 330 (1990), enforced, 949 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1991).
29. Id. at 907 (citing Litton Sys., 300 N.L.R.B. 324, 330 (1990), enforced, 949 F.2d 249 (8th
Cir. 1991) ("[W]ithout evidence that [a] party's conduct at the bargaining table itself indicates an

intent [not] to reach agreement, [misconduct away from the table] has not been held to provide an
independent basis to find bad-faith bargaining.")).
30. 341 N.L.R.B. 904 (2004).
31. Id. at 906.
32. Id. at907.
33. St. George Warehouse, 341 N.L.R.B. at 908.
34. 938 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1991).
35. Id. at 822.
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agreement. ' ' 36 However, in upholding the Board's finding that Overnite
was guilty of surface bargaining, the court considered declarations made
by the employer's vice president indicating Overnite's unlawful
intentions prior to the commencement of bargaining.37 When those
statements were viewed alongside the employer's behavior at the
bargaining table, "there [arose] a fair inference" that Overnite was not
bargaining honestly and in good faith.38 According to the Seventh
Circuit, the employer "was not 'persuaded' because it never had any
intention to be 'persuaded'; the company
was making good on a promise
39
never to cooperate with the Union.
Evaluating these circumstances is a significant challenge for the
Board, considering that inferences must be drawn from conflicting
testimony and facts. 40 In conducting its totality of the circumstances
examination, the Board may examine the parties' substantive
proposals. 4 1 Although the Board does not evaluate the substance of
particular proposals, it has explicitly retained the right to examine
specific proposals and determine "whether, on the basis of objective
factors, a demand is clearly designed to frustrate agreement on a
collective-bargaining contract., 42 That is, the Board strives to avoid
making subjective judgments concerning the substance of proposals whether they are acceptable or unacceptable - when determining a
party's intent from the aggregate of its conduct.43 The Ninth Circuit has
held that, while the Board must exercise caution in inferring motivation
from the content of bargain proposals, where the entire spectrum of
proposals put forward by a party is so consistently and predictably
unpalatable to the other party, such proposal content supports an
36.
37.

Id.
Id.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 150-51 (1956) (determining if an

employer acted in good faith when it claimed it could not afford a wage increase, but refused to
disclose financial statements).
41. NLRB v. F. Strauss & Son, Inc., 536 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing NLRB v. Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir. 1953)).
42. Reichhold Chemicals, 288 N.L.R.B. 69, 69 (1988), enforced in part, 906 F.2d 719 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); Liquor Indus. Bargaining Group, 333 N.L.R.B. 1219, 1220 (2001), enforced, 50 Fed.
Appx. 444 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In Reichhold, the Board granted motions for reconsideration following

an earlier decision, in part to emphasize the Board's right to examine specific proposals that may be
relevant in determining good faith. Reichhold, 288 N.L.R.B. at 69. The Board noted in the
supplemental decision that language in its prior decision "could lead to the misconception that under
no circumstances will the Board consider the content of a party's proposals in assessing the totality
of its conduct during negotiations." Id.
43. See Liquor Indus. BargainingGroup, 333 N.L.R.B. at 1220.
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inference of intent to frustrate agreement because the proposing party
should know that agreement is impossible. 4
The Board's Role Overseeing Bargaining
The Board's findings must be upheld if they are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.45 The Board must be
aware of the reasonableness of the positions taken by the employer in the
course of bargaining negotiations if it "is not to be blinded by empty talk
and by the mere surface motions of collective bargaining. ' ' 46 However,
under section 8(d), "the Board may not, either directly or indirectly,
compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive
terms of collective bargaining agreements. 4 7
These competing principles demonstrate the inherent tension within
the NLRA between the obligation to "meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment," and the proviso that "such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession., 48 The duty imposed on the parties under section 8(d) to
bargain collectively does not obligate a party to make concessions or
yield a position fairly maintained. 49 "Nothing in the labor law compels
either party negotiating over mandatory subjects of collective bargaining
to yield on its initial bargaining position., 50 Good faith bargaining is all
that is required, so long as the proposals are not unusually harsh and
unreasonable. 5
44. NLRB v. Mar-Len Cabinets, Inc., 659 F.2d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 1981). See also infra text
accompanying notes 204-11 (discussing NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwiches and circumstances
where the content of bargaining proposals - specifically harsh and unreasonable management rights
clauses - evinces an intent to frustrate the bargaining process).
45. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490-91 (1951).
46. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir. 1953) (citing Wilson &
Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.2d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1940)).
47. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 106 (1970) (quoting NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co.,
343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952)).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000).
49. Am. Nat'l, 343 U.S. at 404 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)).
50. Pease Co. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 1044, 1050 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting McCourt v. Cal.
Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1200 (6th Cir. 1979)).
51. See NLRB v. Wright Motors, Inc., 603 F.2d 604, 609 & n.7 (7th Cir. 1979). The positions
the Seventh Circuit found to be unreasonably harsh would have put the employees in a far worse
position with the union than without it and would have damaged the union's ability to function as
the employees' bargaining representative. Id. at 608 n.5. They included a guaranteed open shop, a
lengthy management rights clause not subject to the grievance procedure, an "extraordinary" no
strike-no lockout clause, and limited and permissive arbitration. Id.
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At the same time, parties are obligated to do more than merely "go
through the motions" of negotiation. There must be a "serious intent to
adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common ground., 52 Both
the employer and the union have a duty to negotiate with a "sincere
purpose to find a basis of agreement. 5 3 The "performance of the duty to
bargain requires more than a willingness to enter upon a sterile
discussion of union-management differences. ' 54 "However, a party is
entitled to stand firm on a position if he reasonably believes that it is fair
and proper or that
he has sufficient bargaining strength to force the other
55
party to agree.,
III. CONDUCT THAT ALONE

CONSTITUTES BAD FAITH BARGAINING

The duty to bargain collectively, set forth in section 8(a)(5), is
defined by section 8(d) as the duty to "meet ...and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment., 5 6 Based on the express language of the statute, an
employer may violate this duty without a general failure of subjective
good faith, since there is no occasion for the Board or the courts to even
consider the issue of good faith if a party has refused to negotiate in fact
- "to meet and confer" - about any of the mandatory subjects.5 7 A
refusal to actually negotiate over any subject within section 8(d), which
the union seeks to negotiate, violates section 8(a)(5) even if the
employer has every desire to reach an agreement with the union and
sincerely and in good faith bargains to that end. 58 The Supreme Court
has identified certain specific conduct as consistent with a failure to
bargain in good faith: unilateral changes in terms or conditions of
employment, direct dealings with employees, and refusing to sign an
agreed-upon contract.59
52. NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960).
53. NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960) (quoting Globe Cotton
Mills v.NLRB, 103 F.2d 91,94 (5th Cir. 1939)).
54. NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395,402 (1952).
55. St. George Warehouse, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 904, 906 (2004) (citing Atlanta Hilton &
Tower, 271 N.L.R.B. 1600, 1603 (1984)).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000).
57. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962) (citing NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165
F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1948)).
58. Id. at 743.
59. See, e.g., id. at 747-48 (holding that unilateral changes in employment conditions without
prior discussion with the union may be an unfair labor practice in violation of the Act if no
justifying or excusing circumstances are presented); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
678, 684 (1944) (stating that bargaining directly with employees and ignoring the union as the
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First, an employer may not unilaterally change a term or condition
of employment without first bargaining with the union. In NLRB v. Katz,
the Supreme Court held that unilateral action by an employer without
prior discussion with the union amounts to a refusal to negotiate about
the affected conditions of employment under negotiation, and is by
definition inconsistent with a sincere desire to reach agreement with the
union. 6 The Board found that the employer unilaterally granted
numerous merit increases, automatic wage increases and changes in sick
leave policy before negotiations with the union were discontinued and
before an impasse occurred. 6 1 The employer argued that the Board could
not conclude that it had violated section 8(a)(5) based on "unilateral
actions alone, without making a finding of the employer's subjective bad
faith at the bargaining table;" i.e. the unilateral actions were merely
evidence relevant to good faith.62 The Court held that an employer's
unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotiation with
the union violates section 8(a)(5), regardless of whether or not the
employer is found guilty of overall subjective bad faith, as the
implementation of unilateral changes circumvents the employer's duty to
negotiate, which frustrates the objectives of section 8(a)(5) as much as a
63
flat refusal.
Second, an employer's duty to treat a union as the exclusive
bargaining representative of its employees precludes the employer from
dealing directly with its employees with respect to terms and conditions
of employment. In Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 64 the Supreme

employees' exclusive bargaining representative is a violation of the Act); H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB,

311 U.S. 514, 526 (1941) (finding that when an employer and union reach an agreement with regard
to the terms and substance of an employment contract, it is an unfair labor practice if the employer
refuses to sign the contract).
60.
61.
62.
63.

Katz,
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

369 U.S. at 745-47.
741-47.
742.
747. The Second Circuit later expounded upon the theory behind the impermissible

ills of unilateral changes:
[T]here are serious objections to permitting one party to an agreement unilaterally to
hold out this type of inducement to the other. It creates divisive tensions within the
[u]nion . ... Whichever way the [u]nion moves, it loses ground with some part of its
constituency. Union democracy is not furthered by permitting the [employer] to pick the
[u]nion apart piece by piece. The same point may be made where there are both union
and non-union employees. If the [u]nion refuses the benefit, then it may appear, at least
in the short run, to have disadvantaged its members vis-A-vis nonmembers.
NLRB v. Gen. Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 747 (2d Cir. 1969).
64. 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
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Court held that an employer that bargains directly with employees who
have not revoked their designation of the union as their bargaining agent
subverts the requirements to bargain in good faith.65
The Second Circuit elaborated on the nature of direct dealings with
employees as a violation of the Act, not requiring a good faith
determination, in NLRB v. General Electric Co. 66 General Electric is
widely known as the seminal decision prohibiting Boulwareism; that is,
the tactic introduced by General Electric ("GE") vice president Lemuel
R. Boulware, which involved the two-prong bargaining strategy of
refusing to bargain with the union while simultaneously selling
management's offer directly to the employees.67 While the Second
Circuit ultimately concluded that Boulwareism violated the employer's
duty to bargain in good faith, as an initial matter, the court found that GE
committed a ULP when it surreptitiously offered separate settlements to
local officials without negotiating with national union negotiators. 6' The
Second Circuit explained that: "Such tactics are inherently divisive; they
make negotiations difficult and uncertain; they subvert the cooperation
necessary to sustain a responsible and meaningful union leadership. The
evil, then, is not in offering more. It is in the offer [to employees]
itself."69 Thus, while an employer's direct negotiations with employees
rather than the union can be a factor in determining the employer's good
faith, a lack of good faith is not a prerequisite to a finding that an
employer violated the Act by dealing directly with employees.

65.

Id. at 684.

66. 418 F.2d 736 (2dCir. 1969).
67. Id. at 740-41. Specifically, the Board found, and the Second Circuit affirmed, that:

GE's bargaining stance and conduct, considered as a whole, were designed to derogate
the Union in the eyes of its members and the public at large. This plan had two major
facets: first, a take-it-or-leave-it approach ("firm, fair offer") to negotiations in general
which emphasized both the powerlessness and uselessness of the Union to its members,
and second, a communications program that pictured [GE] as the true defender of the

employees' interests, further denigrating the Union, and sharply curbing [GE's] ability to
change its own position.
id. at 756.
68. Id. at 753-55.
69. Id. The Supreme Court's decision in General Electric did not prohibit employers from
communicating with their employees regarding unions. Four months prior to GeneralElectric, the
Court stated in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. that "an employer is free to communicate to his

employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific views about a particular
union, so long as the communications do not contain a 'threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit."' 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). See also Sheridan Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLR.B, 225
F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 2000) (following Gissel).
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Third, an employer may not refuse to sign a written contract once
the agreement has been negotiated and voluntarily agreed-upon. For
example, in H.J Heinz Co. v. NLRB,7 ° the employer reached an
agreement with the union concerning wages, hours and employee
working conditions, but refused to sign any contract embodying the
terms of the agreement. 71 The Board opined that the refusal to sign a
written contract was a common means of frustrating the bargaining
process and a method of refusing to recognize a union as a legitimate
bargaining representative.72 The Supreme Court held that while the Act
does not compel an employer to enter into bargaining agreements, it
does not follow that after reaching an agreement, an employer may
refuse to sign it. 73 While employers may refuse to agree on substantive
terms during collective bargaining, refusing to sign a previously agreedupon contract only serves to undermine the union and frustrate the
bargaining process, and as such violates the duty to bargain in good
faith. 74
IV. SURFACE BARGAINING

In NLRB v. Reed & PrinceMfg. Co.,75 the First Circuit framed the
ultimate issue in surface bargaining cases as:
whether it is to be inferred from the totality of the employer's conduct
that [the employer] went through the motions of negotiation as an
elaborate pretense with no sincere desire to reach an agreement if
possible, or that it bargained in good faith
but was unable to arrive at
76
an acceptable agreement with the union.
The Act does not say, however, "that any 'agreement' reached will
validate whatever tactics have been employed to exact it."' 77 Rather, the
Act clearly envisions productive bargaining; that is, the parties making a

70. 311 U.S. 514(1941).

71. Id. at 523.
72. Id. at 523-24.
73. Id. at 525.
74. Id. at 526, cited in Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 337 N.L.R.B. 499, 504 (2002).
75. 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1953).
76. Id. at 134. "Reed & Prince submitted a woefully inadequate and demeaning 'offer' of a
contract." NLRB v. Gen. Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 761 (2d Cir. 1969). The court held that, under
section 8(a)(5), the employer "is obligated to make some reasonable effort in some direction to
compose his differences with the union. Reed & Prince,205 F.2d at 134-35.
77. Gen. Elec. Co.,418F.2dat761.
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"serious attempt to resolve differences and reach a common ground.,

78

The Second Circuit in General Electric recognized that this "herculean
task" arises out of legislating a state of mind, and will never be so
precise that a trier of fact will always know the exact limits of what is
allowed and what is forbidden. 79
To make a charade or sham of conducting negotiations by acting
with the intention of evading an actual agreement violates section 8(a)(5)
and is tantamount to "bad faith" bargaining. 80 It is one thing, however, to
declare that sham negotiations are prohibited, and another entirely to
actually determine whether the negotiations are, in fact, a sham. Judge
John R. Brown cogently described the difficulty in making such a
determination: "to sit at a bargaining table ... or to make concessions
here and there, could be the very means by which to conceal a
purposeful strategy to make bargaining futile or fail., 81 The Second
Circuit determined that the proper means of resolving a charge of bad
faith bargaining is to ascertain the state of mind of the party charged as it
bears upon the party's negotiations.82 Of course, no party to negotiations
is going to admit to bad faith intentions.83 Thus, such motive must be
ascertained from circumstantial evidence.
In one respect, certain types of specific conduct possibly constitute
per se violations of the duty to bargain in good faith since they in effect
amount to a refusal to negotiate in fact.84 Absent such evidence,
however, the Board must determine intent based upon the party's overall
conduct and the totality of the circumstances. The relevant inquiry in
surface bargaining cases is whether, from the context of a party's total
conduct, the party is lawfully engaged in hard bargaining to achieve a
contract it desires or is unlawfully endeavoring to frustrate the
possibility of arriving at any agreement. 85 When considering a party's
good faith bargaining, the Board examines not only the parties' behavior
86
at the negotiating table, but also any conduct away from the table.

78.

Id. at 762 (citing NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477,486-88 (1960)).

79. Id.
80.
81.

Cont'l Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1974).
NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 1960).

82.

Cont'l Ins. Co., 495 F.2d at 48.

83. Id. (citing NLRB v. Patent Trader, Inc., 415 F.2d 190, 197 (2d Cir. 1969)).
84. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
85. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 334 N.L.R.B. 487, 487 (2001) (citations omitted), enforced, 318
F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2003); J. D. Lunsford Plumbing, 254 N.L.R.B. 1360, 1370 (1981) (quoting W.
Coast Casket Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 624, 636 (1971) (citations omitted), enforced in part,469 F.2d 871

(9th Cir. 1971)).
86.

Port Plastics, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 362, 382 (1986).
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With respect to hard bargaining techniques, it is important to
understand that, for example, "[a] company's adamant insistence on
strong pro-management terms also cannot alone support a finding of
failure to bargain., 87 The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hether a
contract should contain a clause fixing standards for such matters as
work scheduling or should provide for more flexible treatment of such
matters is an issue for determination across the bargaining table, not by
the Board."8 8 The Fifth Circuit has noted that if the employer has the
legal right to insist upon the terms of its proposal, a court cannot
construe an exercise of this right as evidence of bad faith. 89 Additionally,
the Act does not require an employer to abandon a position because a
union offers concessions, regardless of the quantity or quality of
concessions offered for abandonment. 90
Elements of Surface Bargaining
The Board and courts have held that bargaining conduct that does
not rise to the level of a per se violation of the obligation to bargain in
good faith may still support an inference of bad faith or surface
bargaining when considered in conjunction with all of the other evidence
of the party's bargaining behavior. 91 Thus, a finding of surface
bargaining necessarily results from a totality of the circumstances
review. In Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 92 the Board set forth seven factors
that signal a refusal to bargain in good faith:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

delaying tactics;
unreasonable bargaining demands;
unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining;
efforts to bypass the union;
failure to designate an agent with sufficient bargaining authority;
provisions; and
withdrawal of already agreed-upon
93
arbitrary scheduling of meetings.

87. NLRB v. Pac. Grinding Wheel Co., 572 F.2d 1343, 1348 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Chevron
Oil Co. v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 1067, 1072-73 (5th Cir. 1971)).
88. NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395,409 (1952).
89. NLRB v. Cummer-Graham Co., 279 F.2d 757,760 (5th Cir. 1960).
90. NLRB v. United Clay Mines Corp., 219 F.2d 120, 126 (6th Cir. 1955).
91. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1974); see also NLRB v. Pac. Grinding

Wheel Co., 572 F.2d at 1348 (citations omitted).
92. 271 N.L.R.B. 1600 (1984).
93. Id. at 1603; see also Regency Serv. Carts, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. No. 44, at 2 (Aug. 27, 2005)
(citing Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 271 N.L.R.B. at 1603); St. George Warehouse, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B.
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One need not engage in all of these activities to be found to have
bargained in bad faith; rather, surface bargaining occurs when a party's
overall conduct, as defined by the Atlanta Hilton factors, reflects an
intention to avoid reaching agreement. 94 As discussed above, two of
these factors - unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining
and efforts to bypass the union by negotiating directly with employees may, on their own, violate other provisions of the Act. 95 When adopting
bargaining positions, making proposals and strategizing how "hard" to
bargain, restraint with respect to these two factors should be considered,
based on the potential for liability under the Act.
The remainder of this article will examine types of conduct that the
Board and Courts of Appeal have deemed to be either violative of, or
consistent with, surface bargaining, although any such inquiry is factsensitive. There is no hard and fast rule for finding surface bargaining,
and no "cure all" exists that can insulate a party from such a finding.
Conduct that Violates the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith:Delaying
Tactics, Unreasonable Demands and Take-It-Or-Leave-It Offers
The following cases provide examples of individual conduct that,
when reviewed under the totality of the circumstances approach, have
resulted in findings of surface bargaining:
In ContinentalIns. Co. v. NLRB, 96 the Second Circuit found that the
employer:
pursued a pattern of tactics designed to delay the negotiations as long
as possible, to denigrate and undermine the Union, to make it
impossible for the Union to reach a collective bargaining agreement
without virtually surrendering its right to represent the employees in
disputes over working conditions, and to make it appear to the
employees that they would be worse off with Union representation
and
97
a collective bargaining agreement than if they had neither.
Although the employer withdrew or modified some of its more
904, 926 (2004) (citations omitted); Hardesty Co., 336 N.L.R.B. 258, 259-60 (2001), enforced,
NLRB v. Hardesty Co., 308 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
94. Altorfer Mach. Co., 332 N.L.R.B. 130, 148 (2000).
95. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747-48 (1962); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 (1944).

96.
97.

495 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 48.
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extreme and confusing proposals after considerable delay, the court
nonetheless concluded that it had caused "unconscionably protracted
98
negotiations [that] made a mockery of [the] bargaining procedure.,
Employing the totality of the circumstances approach, the court was
persuaded by a number of especially insincere actions by the employer.
First, the employer unnecessarily prolonged the bargaining process by
insisting on duplicative negotiation sessions with two bargaining units,
both of which had identical bargaining proposals. 99 From this evidence,
the Board properly inferred that the employer's objective was to delay
and frustrate the bargaining process.'°° Second, the employer made
unreasonable demands regarding matters outside the scope of mandatory
subjects of bargaining, e.g., that the union agree not to organize or
represent any of the employer's other employees.'0 1 Third, the employer
insisted on language in the CBA that would essentially waive any union
right to grieve or strike over any matter not specifically covered in the
agreement. 10 2 Not coincidentally, the employer then insisted on
including only a limited number of subjects in the contract. 10 3 The4
employer also insisted on the exclusive right to select an arbitrator.'0
The court concluded that these proposals would have placed employees
in a worse position than if they had no contract at all because the
proposals would have effectively waived the union's
right to represent
05
employees in disputes over employment conditions.
The Second Circuit employed similar reasoning in the more recent,
10 6
analogous case Bryant & Stratton Business Institute, Inc. v. NLRB.
Although the parties met sixteen times over approximately fourteen
months, the court found that the employer violated section 8(d) by
failing to meet at reasonable times because it repeatedly refused union
requests to meet on weekends or to have consecutive meetings. 107 The
employer grudgingly made itself available about one day per month, in
the late afternoons, and normally only for abbreviated durations. 0 8
When the parties did meet, Bryant's negotiator was frequently

98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 50.
Id.
at 48.
Id.
at 49.
Id.

102.

Id.

103.

Id.

104.

Id.

105. Id.
106. 140 F.3d 169 (2dCir. 1998).
107. Id. at 182.
108. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

15

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 3
276

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 24:261

unprepared and unable to meaningfully discuss the proposals.10 9 In
addition, the employer failed to provide timely counterproposals, and
when it did provide them, they were unresponsive to the union's
proposals.1 0 Based on these facts and testimony from former Bryant
employees - who stated that the employer's bargaining strategy was to
"engage in conduct that would undermine the union and lead to its
decertification" - the court concluded that Bryant's main focus was to
prospectively terminate its bargaining obligation by weakening member
support, not on successful collective bargaining negotiations."' As
a
12
result, the court affirmed the Board's finding of surface bargaining. 1
While there is no rule outlining the exact frequency with which
bargaining sessions must occur in order to insulate an employer from a
potential unfair labor practice charge, the cases do provide guidance. In
NLRB v. Milgo Industrial,Inc.,1 3 despite being described by the Second
Circuit as "nowhere near so clear against the employer as Continental
Ins. Co.," the court nonetheless found substantial evidence that the
114
employer was responsible for delays in holding bargaining sessions.
The employer conferred primary negotiating authority on a busy outside
attorney, which resulted in one to three month gaps between bargaining
sessions.1 15 Despite union requests for longer and more regular
bargaining sessions, the parties only met seventeen times over a fifteen
month period, each session lasting only a few hours.1 16 The court
concluded that a lawyer's busy schedule was not 117
an acceptable excuse
for failing to meet and bargain at reasonable times.

109. Id. at 183.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 183-84.
112. Id. at 184.
113. 567 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1977).
114. Id. at 544.
115. Id. at 544.
116. Id. at 544-45.
117. Id. at 545 n.6 (citing NLRIB v. Exch. Parts Co., 339 F.2d 829, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1965)); see
also Radisson Plaza Minneapolis v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1376, 1382 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming the

Board's finding that the employer's conduct supported an inference of a failure to bargain in good
faith where employer's chief negotiator engaged in a pattern of dilatory conduct, including
canceling three bargaining sessions, terminating five of eleven sessions significantly earlier than
planned, and refusing union requests for more frequent sessions without explaining his
unavailability, all of which resulted in only eleven meetings over eight months). But see Horsehead
Res. Dev. Co. 154 F.3d 328, 339 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that where employer participated in nine
days of bargaining over a three-week period, offered a significant and innovative wage increase in
response to union demands for more money, bargained late into the evening at the deadline and
offered to continue bargaining the next day under the old contract, "[t]hese [were] simply not the
acts of a company uninterested in reaching agreement on a contract.").
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Also contributing to the finding of surface bargaining in Milgo was
evidence that the employer lacked a sincere desire to reach agreement.
Among other things, the employer objected to a union proposal which
required the employer to do little more than obey federal law prohibiting
age discrimination, was reluctant to allow the union to post notices
"relating to Union matters" on the bulletin board and refused to provide
a water cooler instead of merely providing water to employees.11 8 The
court characterized the employer's actions as a case of sham bargaining
where "each episode 'gained color from each of the others' and "the
Board could legitimately conclude that the whole was greater than the
sum of the parts.' 1 9
More recently, the Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. NLRB. 120 Throughout six months of
regular meetings, the employer insisted on proposals granting it greater
management rights. 121 Following an impasse, the Board found that
Public Service Co. had violated section 8(a)(5) by insisting on proposals
that undermined the union's representative function. 122 The Board
inferred bad faith from the company's conduct away from the bargaining
table, including an email it sent to its employees aimed at obtaining a
decertification election. 123 The Tenth Circuit, affirming the Board,
concluded that the employer's rigid adherence to such proposals
demonstrated that it could not seriously have expected meaningful
collective bargaining. 124
In August of 2005, the Board found that the combination of "takeit-or-leave-it" comments made by the employer's negotiators, delay in
providing information to the union and other dilatory tactics
demonstrated that the employer unlawfully aimed to frustrate the
possibility of arriving at agreement in Regency Service Carts,Inc. 125 The
negotiator drew several "lines in the sand" concerning various
contractual provisions, including when he literally drew a line on the
back of his notepad and said, "there won't be any contract with a
prohibition on subcontracting."' 126 He also stated that, "we're not going

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Milgo Indus., 567 F.2d at 545 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000)).
Id.
318 F.3d 1173, 1178 (1Oth Cr.2003).
Id. at 1176.
Id.
Id. at 1177 n.3.
Id.at 1180.
345 N.L.R.B. No. 44, at 2-3 (Aug. 27, 2005).
Id. at 2.
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to be reasonable. We want what we want and I'll sit here for the next
three years," and in response to a union request to schedule a future
meeting, said that he would be willing to meet but that he was "going to
say no to everything." 127 According to the Board, these comments
implied that the employer had128no intention to compromise and was
negotiating with a closed mind.
Although the parties held twenty-nine bargaining sessions over
thirty-two months, the sessions decreased in frequency. 129 The Board
found that this was due to the claimed unavailability of the employer's
negotiator, who cancelled eight of the twenty-nine scheduled sessions,
frequently arrived late when he did show, left sessions to take telephone
calls, and excused himself early despite the union's expressed desire to
continue negotiating. 130 Moreover, when scheduling future sessions, the
dates suggested by the union were consistently rejected by the employer,
who preferred instead to meet after the last date the union provided. 131
Additionally, the employer's negotiator was unwilling to explain its
proposals and refused to describe current shop practices.1 32 The
negotiator demanded that the union ask its employee members to answer
its inquiries about current conditions of employment, delaying
bargaining, and claimed that this information was irrelevant because the
employer did not intend to change its position. 133 Finally, the employer
delayed submitting requested information to the union concerning
various safety and personnel issues. 134 The employer would initially
make spurious and frivolous objections to clearly relevant requests, and
then eventually supply the information only after an unreasonable
amount of time had passed. 135 The Board held that the totality of the
employer's conduct demonstrated
an intent to frustrate negotiations in
136
violation of section 8(a)(5).
In United Technologies Corp.,137 the Board determined that the
employer refused to bargain in good faith after reviewing the totality of

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3 (citing Mid-Continent Concrete, 336 N.L.R.B. 258, 259 (2001)).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

134. Id. at 5.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 6.
137. Hamilton Standard Div. of United Techs. Corp. (United Technologies Corp.), 296
N.L.R.B. 571 (1989).
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the employer's conduct, which included delay tactics and threats that
bargaining could be done on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. 38 The
employer delayed the bargaining process by submitting single proposals
to the union and soliciting feedback regarding each individual proposal
before presenting its next proposal. 139 Additionally, after almost a year
of bargaining and repeated prompting from the union, the employer still
failed to present any economic proposals. 40 When the union objected to
the employer's proposal method, the employer's chief negotiator replied
that if the union preferred, negotiations could be postponed until the
employer had a full contract proposal, which the employer would then
present on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. 14 ' The Board found the
employer's piecemeal submission of proposals and insistence on
resolving all non-economic issues before turning to more pressing
concerns to be delaying tactics designed to frustrate the bargaining
process. 142 The chief negotiator's "take-it-or-leave-it" response to the
union's opposition confirmed the employer's bad faith intentions,
according to the Board. 141
By contrast, in Hartz Mountain Corp.,"nn the Board cleared the
employer of surface bargaining allegations where the employer
presented the union with comprehensive, timely counterproposals,
including proposals regarding economic issues. 145 Furthermore, in
determining whether an employer maintains good faith standing, the
Board will consider whether the employer has defined, explained and
advocated its position rather than attempting to thrust provisions on the
union in a "take-it-or-leave-it" manner. 146 The employer's conduct
towards the union at the bargaining table was a determining factor in
these two cases, decided by the Board in the same year: in United
Technologies Corp., the employer's negotiator clearly meant his "takeit-or-leave-it" comment as a threat to thwart the union's dissatisfaction
with the employer's dilatory bargaining techniques, 147 whereas in Hartz
Mountain Corp., the employer explained, advocated and gave reasons

138. Id. at 572.
139. Id. at 571.
140. Id. at 572.
141.

Id. at 571.

142. Id. at 572.
143. Id.
144. 295 N.L.R.B. 418 (1989). For a further discussion of this case, see infra text
accompanying notes 185-89.
145. Id. at 425-26.
146. Id. at 426 (citing AMPAC, 259 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1084-85 (1982)).
147. United Techs. Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 571, 571 (1989).
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for its position on each unresolved item. 148
The Seventh Circuit also had the opportunity to evaluate take-it-orleave-it bargaining tactics in NLRB v. Schwab Foods, Inc., 149 where the
employer vehemently resisted the union's attempt to organize one of its
four grocery stores. 150 The Seventh Circuit upheld a Board ruling that
the employer demonstrated an intent to avoid any agreement with the
union by presenting wage increase proposals to the union under threat of
immediate implementation at all stores. 151 The wage increases were
immediately implemented at the three nonunion stores and, after some
delay, imposed non-retroactively at the unionized store. 152 The actions
by the company created a wage disparity between the represented and
non-represented employees. 153 The Board found that the employer's
tactic of confronting the union with an eleventh-hour "last offer" put the
union in a position where it was forced to either accept implementation,
thereby acknowledging the company's right to unilaterally determine
wage rates, or accept the consequences of partial implementation, which
no doubt would have reflected poorly on the union in the eyes of its
members. 154 Further, the employer's opposition to full retroactivity at the
union store for the same benefits granted at the nonunion locations
strongly suggested an intent to subvert bargaining. 155 United
Technologies Corp., Hartz Mountain Corp. and Schwab Foods thus
make it clear that fully and completely explaining reasonably adopted
positions to the other party, rather than blatantly forcing their positions,
may be required to avoid a finding of surface bargaining.
Conclusions Regarding Violative Conduct
As the preceding cases and Board decisions illustrate, avoiding the
following types of bargaining conduct will decrease the likelihood of
facing liability for surface bargaining under section 8(a)(5), especially
where such conduct occurs at the bargaining table:

148. Hartz Mountain Corp., 295 N.L.RB. at 426.
149. 858 F.2d 1285 (7th Cir. 1988).
150. Id.at 1287.
151. Id.at 1292-93.
152. Id.at 1292.

153.

at 1293.
Id.

154. Id. The employer recognized as much when it told the union that if it did not timely
approve implementation of the wage increase, "'there would have to be some explanation to the
employees as to why the raise was not given"' - insinuating that the employer was poised to place
the blame for the wage disparity on the union. Id.

155. Id.
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"

Dilatory tactics that delay bargaining efforts, including:
"

Limiting available meeting times and decreasing the
frequency of meetings. While the Board has not
established a rule for what is and is not an acceptable
rate of bargaining sessions, case law indicates that
meeting once per month may be considered inadequate.
Additionally, the decisions indicate an expectation that
the frequency of meetings should increase as the parties
get closer to the expiration of a CBA.

"

Canceling bargaining sessions or leaving early without
reasonable explanation.

o

Being unprepared for negotiation sessions.

o

Presenting counterproposals that are not responsive to
union proposals.

o

Requiring duplicative session for similar bargaining
units.

o

Submitting proposals on single issues and refusing to
discuss other relevant topics.

*

Making statements that indicate unlawful intentions.

*

Making unreasonable bargaining demands or adopting
untenable negotiating positions (e.g. refusing to acquiesce to
union proposals that are required by federal law).

*

Issuing take-it-or-leave-it "offers" that essentially leave the
union with only two options: acquiesce or file a ULP charge.

Conduct that is Consistent with the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith:
Insistence on a BargainingPosition, Statements Made by Employees,
Careful Review of Union Proposals& Willingness to Make Concessions
The following cases provide examples of conduct where the Board
and the courts have determined that the employer engaged in hard
Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007
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bargaining, rather than surface bargaining, and thus did not violate
section 8(a)(5):
After laying out the seven surface bargaining factors in Atlanta
Hilton & Tower, the Board concluded that the employer had not engaged
in surface bargaining. 156 The Board cited evidence of the employer's
good faith, including its appearance at thirteen negotiating sessions, its
offer of a wage increase, its agreement in principle to the union's sick
leave proposal, and the prior successful bargaining relationship between
the parties. 157 Under the seven-factor test, the Board found no indication
of any bad faith conduct. 1 58 In addition, the Board concluded that the
employer's firmness in insisting on a one-year
extension of the current
159
contract did not of itself constitute bad faith.
The Board applied this logic in subsequent decisions. In Reichhold
Chemicals, Inc.,160 the Board reaffirmed its earlier decision finding that
the employer's overall conduct was consistent with hard bargaining as
opposed to surface bargaining. 16 1 The employer willingly met and
bargained with the union, attended all scheduled meetings, exchanged
proposals, and fulfilled its procedural obligations. 162 Shortly after the last
meeting, the employer notified a federal mediator that it was willing to
bargain. 163 During the course of twenty-nine bargaining meetings held
over thirteen months, the employer made concessions that led to
agreement between the parties on numerous subjects.164 Although the
employer adhered to its demands for comprehensive management rights
and no-strike provisions, as was its right, it did make some movement on
those subjects in an attempt to reach an agreement. 165
Similarly, in Coastal Electric Cooperative, Inc.,166 the Board held
that the employer's positions, although indicative of hard bargaining,
were not inherently unlawful, and that the employer's failure to make
concessions, in the absence of other indicia of bad faith, was not
67
sufficient evidence of bargaining with intent to avoid agreement.

156.
157.
158.

Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 271 N.L.R.B. 1600, 1603 (1984).
Id. at 1603.

Id.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.

165.
166.

Id.

288 N.L.R.B. 69 (1988).
Id. at 69.
Id. at 70.

Id.
Id.
311 N.L.R.B. 1126 (1993).

167. Id. at 1127.
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Although the employer insisted upon, inter alia, a broad management
rights clause, it explained its proposals in detail, complied with the
union's information requests, met with the union at reasonable times and
places, and reached agreement on numerous proposals, sometimes after
making concessions to address the union's concerns. 168 The Board
distinguished Coastal Electric's conduct from that of the employer in
Bethea Baptist Home v. NLRB, 169 decided earlier that year, where the
employer used evasive tactics to avoid providing requested information,
refused to put agreements in writing, pretended to make concessions
while preserving its proposals in other parts of the contract, and insisted
on proposals that left the union with fewer rights than provided by law
without the contract. 170 Further, the Board found no evidence of antiunion animus away from the bargaining table that would indicate
Coastal Electric's intent to frustrate agreement.17 1 The Board also
considered it probative that the union remained as firm in its basic
positions as did the employer. 172
Statements made by management negotiators and officials are often
debated as evidence of an employer's lack of good faith in surface
bargaining cases. In Chevron Oil Co. v. NLRB, 173 the employer's
production superintendent made a series of oral and written
communications to its employees regarding the company's position on
the union. 174 While the Board determined that these communications
were indicia of bad faith, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, concluding that the
evidence did not justify the inference that the company was not prepared75
to accept and deal in good faith with the union if it won the election.
The court found that, although the production superintendent conducted
an active campaign to defeat the union and made it clear to employees
that the company would rather they remain unorganized, management
was entitled to its opinion. 176 The fact that the employer made its
position clear was not sufficient, in itself, to create a presumption
that
77
1
faith.
bad
in
made
were
negotiations
contract
subsequent
In contrast, statements by the employer that create the impression
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. (citations omitted).
310 N.L.R.B. 156 (1993).
CoastalElec., 311 N.L.R.B. at 1127 n.5.
Id. at 1127.
Id.
442 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1070.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that the employer will never recognize the union or sign a collective
bargaining agreement are more likely to be considered in finding that the
employer engaged in bad faith bargaining. For example, in Overnite
Transportation Co., 178 the Seventh Circuit based a finding of liability
from declarations made by the employer's vice president that he would
never sign a contract with the union and that he would do everything in
his "extreme power" to keep the union out. 179 In addition to potentially
leading to liability for surface bargaining under section 8(a)(5),
comments made by management regarding its position on the union may
negatively impact employee morale, create negative publicity and
ultimately have the opposite of the intended effect.
Although statements by negotiating parties may reflect an intention
not to bargain in good faith, the Board has attempted to not penalize
parties for remarks made in the give-and-take atmosphere of collective
bargaining.180 "To lend too close an ear to the bluster and banter of
' For example, in St. George
negotiations would frustrate the Act[]."181
Warehouse, Inc., the Board reversed a finding of surface bargaining
based in part on a statement made by the employer's counsel after a
bargaining session: "[W]e both know what's going to happen here;
you're not going to get a contract, and the Union [is] going to end up
abandoning the shop."'1 82 The Board concluded that this isolated
comment, uttered after a difficult bargaining session, appeared to be
nothing more than a frustrated prediction indicating that the parties
would not be able to reach agreement. 83 Thus, as the Sixth Circuit
succinctly stated, "to determine the existence
of bad faith, we look to
1 84
bargaining conduct, not bargaining rhetoric."
Hartz Mountain Corp. provides guidance on the type of detailed
review of bargaining proposals that insulate employers from allegations
178.

938 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1991); see supra text accompanying notes 34-39.

179.
180.
181.

Overnite Transp. Co., 938 F.2d at 816-17.
Logemann Bros., 298 N.L.R.B. 1018, 1021 (1990).
Allbritton Commc'ns, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 201, 206 (1984), enforced, 766 F.2d 812 (3d

Cir. 1985).
182.
183.

St. George Warehouse, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 904, 908 (2004).
Id.

184. Pleasantview Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLRB, 351 F.3d 747, 758 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Where
the overall bargaining conduct indicates good faith and willingness to negotiate, a stray statement
indicating inflexibility will not overcome the general tenor of good faith negotiation."). But see
NLRB v. Hardesty Co., 308 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Board properly
considered statements made by supervisors and managers around the time of the company's
proposals that, when viewed in conjunction with the its regressive and largely unexplained
bargaining positions, reasonably indicated the employer's intent to wait a year and seek
decertification of the union, a violation of section 8(a)(5)).
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of surface bargaining. 185 At an early bargaining session, the employer's
negotiator suggested that the parties review seriatim each of the union's
proposed contract provisions for clarification and discuss all questions as
they arose.186 The union agreed to this procedure, which lasted for an
additional nineteen bargaining sessions over then next nine months.' 87
Based on this evidence, the Board rejected the General Counsel's
contention that the employer engaged in prolonged questioning in bad
faith, concluding instead that the purpose of the questioning was to gain
a complete understanding of the union's proposals.' 88 Similarly, the
Board found that it was reasonable for the employer to secure answers
from the union on the union's proposal before submitting its
counterproposal. 189
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.19° provides another example of
bargaining techniques that are not considered surface bargaining. The
Office of the General Counsel found that the employer presented
proposals "in a timely and comprehensive format while giving the
[u]nion full opportunity to reject, suggest changes or counter-propose
alternatives."' 9' These findings included:
*

The employer gave evidence of why it believed that improving
production was necessary, pointing to its accumulated losses
and debt and its capital investments.

"

When the union subsequently raised concerns about some of
the employer's proposals, the employer fully addressed those
concerns and repeatedly asked the union to propose alternative
methods of addressing the employer's need for productivity
improvements.

*

Procedurally, the employer's formal written proposal accurately
reflected the items previously presented orally, and the
employer gave the union an annotated copy of the existing

185.

See supra text accompanying notes 144-48.

186. Hartz Mountain Corp., 295 N.L.R.B. 418, 419-20 (1989).
187. See id. at419-22.
188. Id. at425.
189. Id.
190. No. 25-CA-23416, N.L.R.B. Gen. Couns. Adv. Mem., 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 23, at
*1 (May 11, 1995), availableat http://www.nlrb.gov/shared-files/advice%20memo/1 995/
b051195 bridge.html.
191. Id.at*38.
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agreement.
*

The employer did not engage in dilatory or other obstructive
tactics at the bargaining table. Rather, the employer bargained
with the union forty-six times over almost four months and
made some concessions throughout.

*

While the employer did not respond to the union's request to
narrow the issues by taking off the table any provisions it did
not need, the employer openly discussed with the union each of
its concerns.

*

When the union complained of time constraints on the
negotiations, the employer quickly agreed to the
union's
92
proposal to indefinitely extend the existing contract.'

The General Counsel concluded that the employer had bargained in
good faith because there was no basis to find that the employer frustrated
the agreement with its demands. 193
Conclusions Regarding Consistent Conduct
As the preceding cases and Board decisions illustrate, the following
types of bargaining conduct decrease the likelihood of liability for a
finding of surface bargaining under section 8(a)(5):
*

Attending frequent meetings with the union.

*

Explaining management's position on issues to be bargained.

*

Making concessions and agreeing on some issues.

*

Fully explaining rejection of union proposals.

*

Proposing wage increases.

*

Making timely, comprehensive counterproposals.

192. Id. at *3940.
193. Jd. at*41-42.
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*

Expressing willingness to continue bargaining even after
expiration of CBA (e.g. by agreeing to temporarily extend
current CBA or work with federal mediator).

Additionally, demonstrating a willingness to consider at least some
union proposals can offset or counter the risk of surface bargaining
liability resulting from insisting on a particular lawful position. Finally,
making statements regarding the party's position on negotiations, and/or
predictions on the outcome of bargaining, do not necessarily form the
basis of liability for surface bargaining.
Other Types of Conduct that have SurfaceBargainingImplications

Management Rights and Union Security Clauses
Negotiation of management rights and union security clauses both
have implications for surface bargaining. Management rights are those
rights that are essential to management in carrying out the function of
the enterprise.1 94 Management rights clauses typically reserve for
management all rights not modified by the contract or specifically
enumerated therein. 95 Union security clauses require employees to
become members of a union as a condition of employment. 196 Section
8(a)(3) of the Act permits employers and unions to enter into agreements
requiring all employees to become union members.' 97 However, the
Supreme Court has interpreted section 8(a)(3) to mean that the only
"membership" a union can require is the payment of fees and dues, 198
and that section 8(a)(3) does not permit unions to exact dues or fees over
the objection of nonmembers for activities that are not germane to
collective
bargaining,
grievance
adjustment,
or
contract
administration.19 9
Insistence on a broad management rights clause is not itself
194. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRKs, 634 (Alan Miles Ruben ed., 6th ed.
2003). There are varying views on how broadly to interpret management rights. See id. at 635-41.
195. Id.§13.3,at661.
196. Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 37 (1998) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3) (2000); Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735,744-45 (1988)).
197. 29 U.S.C § 158(a)(3).
198. NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742-43 (1963) (quoting Radio Officers' Union
of Commercial Tels. Union, A. F. L. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,41 (1954)).
199. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 487 U.S. at 745, 762-63 (citing Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., 466 U.S.
435, 448 (1984)).
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inherently unlawful or evidence of bad faith .2a 0 However, because
management rights clauses reserve rights exclusively for the employer,
the Board and the courts have adopted a position safeguarding the rights
of the employee. 20 1 This position is not dissimilar from that taken with
respect to the drafter in contract law: just as ambiguities are interpreted
against the drafter of a contract, management rights clauses are often
viewed with a cautious eye. The Board has held that management
proposals that seek to secure the employer's right to act in a unilateral
and unrestricted fashion on key terms and conditions of employment such as establishing total employer discretion over wages and the
assignment of unit work, diminishing or abolishing grievance and
arbitration processes - create a fundamental shift in the bargaining
relationship and may effectively nullify the union's ability to carry out
its statutory function as the employees' bargaining representative.202 The
Board and the courts have tended to be skeptical of management rights
proposals that are so comprehensive they essentially preempt the union's
representative function, and, if accepted, would leave employees with
less protection than they had prior to electing a collective bargaining
representative. 203
An example of a decision analyzing the negotiation of management
rights clauses as it relates to surface bargaining is NLRB v. A-] King Size
Sandwiches, Inc.2° The Eleventh Circuit found that the Board correctly
inferred bad faith from the company's insistence on proposals, including
a management rights clause, that were so unusually harsh and
unreasonable that they were predictably unworkable. 205 The
management rights clause at issue controlled virtually all significant
terms and conditions of employment, including promotions, demotions,
discharge, discipline, layoff, recall, subcontracting and assignment of
unit work to supervisors, leaving the union's "participation" in the
process meaningless. 20 6 The employer focused its efforts on requiring

200. Coastal Elec. Coop., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 1126, 1127 (1993) (citing Hostar Marine Transp.
Sys., Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 188 (1990); Logemann Bros., 298 N.L.R.B. 1018 (1990); Commercial
Candy Vending Div., 294 N.L.R.B. 908 (1989)).
201. See, e.g., Hydrotherm, Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. 990 (1991). The court held that where an
employer's insistence on broad management rights clauses would leave employees and their
representative with less than they would otherwise have without an employment contract, the
employer's insistence is evidence of bad-faith bargaining. Id. at 995 (citations omitted).
202. See id. at 990-95.
203. See id. at 995 (citations omitted).
204. 732 F.2d 872 (11th Cir. 1984).
205. Id. at 873.
206. Id. at 875.
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employees to surrender their statutory rights to bargain, strike, and
subject matters to grievance and arbitration procedures, without offering
any real incentive for the surrender of such rights, and refused to give
the union any voice whatsoever concerning employee work and safety
rules, overtime assignments, transfers, retirement and other mandatory
subjects of bargaining. 0 7
The court ultimately held that the combination of the broad
management rights and zipper clauses,20 8 along with the employer's
demand for a no-strike clause without any concessions, "clearly
demonstrated surface bargaining used as a cloak to conceal the
employer's bad faith."20 9 The A-] King Size Sandwiches court
distinguished the employer's behavior from that in Chevron Oil Co. v.
NLRB, where the employer did not demand unilateral control over every
significant term and condition of employment. 2 10 Also of note in A-]
King Size Sandwiches was that the employer responded to the union's
objections to the breadth of its original management rights clause by
submitting new proposals that were even broader, a tactic the Eleventh
Circuit found to clearly indicate the employer's lack of desire to work
211
towards an agreement.
Negotiation of union security clauses may lead to the same pitfalls.
For example, in Hospitality Motor Inn, Inc.,2 t2 the Board found that the
employer had a fixed intent not to reach agreement as to union
security. 2113 The employer took the position that the union's request for a
union-security clause would preclude reaching an agreement, even if the
214
parties could reach resolution of all other issues. The employer went
so far as to state that it would not agree to the clause even if 100% of the
employees signed authorization cards. 2t5 The Board found that the
employer's intransigent intent not to reach agreement on union security
was but one aspect of a totality of conduct evincing a failure to bargain

207.

Id. at 875-77.

208. A zipper clause may take "the form of either an acknowledgment that the written contract
constitutes the parties' entire agreement and is a waiver of the right to bargain about other
conditions, or a specific affirmation that management rights are not limited by prior practices."
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 194, at 620-21.
209. A-I King Size Sandwiches, 732 F.2d at 878 (quoting NLRB v. Johnson Mfg. Co., 458

F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1972)).
210. Id.
211.
212.

Id. at 877.
249 N.L.R.B. 1036 (1980), enforced, 667 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1982).

213. Id. at 1036 n.1.
214. Id. at 1038-39.
215.

Id. at 1039.
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in good faith.21 6 However, the tipping point for the Board in concluding
that the employer did not satisfy its statutory obligation to bargain in
good faith was that the employer's "philosophical" opposition to the
union security clause was absolute and obstructionist." 7
Bargaining to Impasse
When labor negotiations reach an impasse or deadlock, an
employer's implementation of unilateral changes in working conditions
do not necessarily violate the Act, as they would in the absence of an
impasse. 2 8 The exploitation of this rule by sabotaging negotiations to
"manufacture" an impasse while giving the appearance of negotiating in
good faith may constitute surface bargaining. 21 9 "The touchstone for
determining whether a genuine 'impasse' or 'deadlock' existed at the
time the employer instituted unilateral changes is the absence of any
realistic possibility
that continuation of the negotiations would have
220
been fruitful.
In ConAgra, Inc. v. NLRB, the Board agreed with the AU that the
employer entered negotiations with a predetermined resolve not to budge
from its initial position and that the employer engaged in surface
bargaining by manufacturing an impasse.22 ' While the D.C. Circuit
agreed that there was evidence that the employer thought that the union
would likely resist the proposed concessions vigorously, it concluded
that preparing for a potential breakdown in negotiations is quite different
from intentionally causing one. 222 The existence of an employer-created
contingency plan did not fairly lead to the inference that the employer
wanted to create an impasse and force the union to strike; rather, the
contingency plan simply showed the employer's judgment that the union
was likely to consistently refuse any attempt to reduce wages.223 The
court held that the employer was entitled to act on this judgment and
prepare for a possible strike.224 This same principle applied to the
employer's plans to improve security and hire replacement workers -

216.

Id. at 1040 (citations omitted).

217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. (citing Sweeney & Co. v. NLRB, 437 F.2d 1127, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1971)).

221.

Id. (citations omitted).

222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Am. Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
ConAgra, Inc. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1435, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Id. (citing Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967)).
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while the employer took these actions in anticipation of a strike, it does
not follow that such actions constitute evidence that the employer
intended to bring about the anticipated strike.225
Duty to Disclose Information
The ConAgra court also found the employer's behavior consistent
with good faith bargaining with regard to the duty to provide
information to the union.226 The Supreme Court has held that employers
are obligated to provide the union with information relevant to the
collective bargaining process in certain circumstances under section
8(a)(5). 227 This duty to disclose relevant information is also construed as
an element of the duty to bargain in good faith.228 When a union makes a
request for relevant information, the applicable legal standard is that the
employer has a duty to provide the information in a timely fashion or to
adequately explain why the information will not be furnished.229
Although information concerning the terms and conditions of
employment is presumed relevant, no such presumption applies to
information regarding an employer's financial structure and condition.2 3 °
A union must demonstrate that any requested financial information is
relevant to the negotiations before the employer will be required to
supply such information.23'
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Truitt, the Board heard
a series of cases that explored the circumstances under which an
employer's statements and conduct during negotiations can cause the
employer's financial information to become relevant to the negotiations.
Ultimately, the Board announced in Nielsen Lithographing Co.232 that it
would distinguish between employer claims of "inability to pay" union
proposals and employer statements and conduct, suggesting, in a more

225. Id. at 1444-45 (citations omitted).
226. Id. at 1442-44.
227.

NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-54 (1956).

228. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979) (citing Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
at 152-54; NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432,435-38 (1967)).
229. Regency Serv. Carts, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. No. 44, at 3-4 (Aug. 27, 2005) (citations
omitted); Bryant & Stratton Bus. Inst., 321 N.L.R.B. 1007, 1044 (1996) (citations omitted),
enforced, 140 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998); see also id. at 1012-17 (discussing the duty to provide
information).
230. ConAgra, 117 F.3d at 1439 (citing Ohio Power Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 987, 991 (1975); Int'l
Woodworkers v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 483,484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1959)).
231. Id. (citing Int'l Woodworkers, 263 F.2dat 484-85).
232. 305 N.L.R.B. 697 (1991).
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general fashion, that accession to union demands would create
"economic difficulties or business losses or the prospect of layoffs. '233
In Nielsen, the Board held that the company's negotiating statements and
conduct clearly were not susceptible to the "inability to pay"
interpretation that would trigger an obligation to turn over financial
data. 4 The employer repeatedly stressed that it continued to turn a
profit (although it claimed to be losing business to competitors),
disavowed any claim of inability to pay, and said only that it would face
difficulties meeting union-proposed labor costs in the future. 235 The
Seventh Circuit subsequently modified the Board's reasoning, extending
employers' duty to substantiate "claims of poverty, or any other
substantiatable factual claim," if the union so demands.236
In ConAgra, as in Nielsen, the employers' representatives informed
the union that the companies were profitable, but claimed that wage
concessions were still necessary so that the companies could protect and
improve their ability to compete.237 ConAgra's representatives made
comments such as, "[i]f we do not take immediate measures there are
probabilities we will not be here in the future" and "I have seen the
Company's decline during the last four years . . . [i]f we are not
competitive we cannot survive," which the court deemed not to be
alarmist and below the "inability to pay" threshold.238 The Nielsen line
of cases thus instruct that statements that cannot reasonably be
interpreted as assertions that an employer is unable to pay the wages
demanded by a union are consistent with good faith bargaining.
V. CONCLUSION
The Board decisions and Court of Appeals interpretations outlined
in this article should provide guidance as to what bargaining conduct
gives rise to a finding of surface bargaining. However, good faith
determinations in any practice of law are by nature fact-sensitive, and, as
evidenced by some of the outcomes discussed herein, cases with
remarkably similar factual criteria have sometimes resulted in
significantly different results.
So how is one to know what types of bargaining conduct it can and
233. Id. at 700.
234. Id. at700-01.
235. Id.

236. Graphic Commc'ns Int'l Union v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1168, 1171 (7th Cir. 1992).
237. ConAgra, Inc. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1435, 1442 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
238. Id. at 1442-43.
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cannot (or should and should not) engage in? A common sense approach
appears best - if it looks like it is not in good faith and smells like it is
not in good faith, it likely is not in good faith. And as many of the
largest, most sophisticated employers have learned through adverse
outcomes, the Board and the courts are unlikely to be misled by even the
most complex strategies aimed at undermining good faith bargaining.
Certainly, "hard" bargaining is lawful. But under the Act, even
employers that utilize permissible "hard" bargaining techniques must
leave room to reasonably contemplate adapting their position towards an
end of reaching agreement with the union. The danger for an employer is
in allowing a "hard" bargaining stance to crystallize into a "win at all
costs" mentality, which could lead to the use of unlawful surface
bargaining tactics.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

33

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 3

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol24/iss2/3

34

